possibly maybe

There are two notions of necessity floating around that easily get conflated: (i) exists in all possible worlds, and (ii) can't not exist. But (ii) can't be captured by (i); (ii) is more fine-grained than (i).  Indeed, it's epistemically possible that a being is necessary in sense (i), but not in sense (ii).  To see this, say that a world stub is some initial temporal segment of a possible world (whether beginningless or not). Now consider that it it's epistemically possible for a god (an uncreated, metaphysically independent being) G to exist in the world stub of every possible world, and yet go out of existence at some time downstream of the world stub of at least one -- but perhaps many, and perhaps even every -- possible world (say it commits suicide due to eternal boredom, or it's annihilated by some other being downstream of one or more world stubs). It's therefore epistemically possible for G to be necessary in sense (i), but not in sense (ii). This has

Kit Fine famously argued for the inadequacy of possible-worlds analysis of essence. Below is a related criticism of my own.  Call the phenomenon of a bearer having a property in all of the worlds it occupies, ‘rigid exemplification’.  What’s the relationship between essential properties and rigid exemplification? On the standard possible-worlds account, the latter constitutes an analysis of the former: the right-hand side gives a list of the constituents of the item expressed on the left-hand side: (EPdef) F is an essential property of x =def.  x has F in all (metaphysically) possible worlds in which x exists. A slightly weaker account of the relationship has it that while the latter isn’t an analysis of the constituents of the former, the latter and the former are yet necessarily co-extensive : (EPiff) Necessarily, F is an essential property of x if, and only if, x has F in all (metaphysically) possible worlds in which x exists. I worry that EPdef and EPiff are both false.  For while

On the standard possible-worlds analysis of modality, for some x to be possible is for x to exist in at least one possible world. From this, it follows that x is impossible just in case there is no possible world at which x exists. Others have already discussed the inadequacy of the standard possible-worlds analysis of modality, but here'd I'd like to record a worry of my own: It's too coarse-grained to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic impossibilities; in particular, it's too coarse-grained to handle putative cases of entities that are intrinsically possible, yet extrinsically impossible. Thus, consider the following thought experiment: Goody and Baddy Consider two beings, Goody and Baddy. Goody is an Anselmian being, and Baddy is an inherently malevolent being who gets his kicks by torturing all other creatures that happen to exist. However, in virtue of his essential goodness, Goody is inherently such that he prevents the existence of Baddy in any world in

1. Modest vs. Ambitious Modal Epistemologies Many strong efforts have been made in recent years to reduce the mystery of modal knowledge. One key area of such efforts has the modest aim of explaining our knowledge of “nearby” or humdrum possibilities. Clear examples of humdrum possibilities include those regarding the possibility of sipping water, painting houses, crossing roads, and cutting limes.  Call accounts that aim to explain possibilities of this sort, modest modal epistemologies.   However, some accounts of modal epistemology have higher aspirations. Such accounts aim to justify “far out” or exotic possibilities remote from ordinary experience. Clear examples of far out or exotic possibility claims remote from ordinary experience include those about disembodied souls, zombies, personal fission, and maximally perfect gods. Call modal epistemologies that aim to justify possibilities of this sort, ambitious modal epistemologies. Now of course many philosophers — myself included —

Rough Draft. First Picture: At the fundamental level of reality, all that exists are point-sized objects bearing wholly intrinsic properties. All else supervenes on the fundamental level.  Second picture: At the fundamental level of reality, a significant number of things exist that are interdependent, interlocking, interrelated. A significant number of essential properties at this level are relational properties. The first picture warrants confidence in wide scope for modal knowledge. For on that view, one can generate a new possible world merely by adding, subtracting, and recombining the base-level entities in virtually any way you like without the threat that a given recombination is impossible.  By contrast, the second picture doesn't warrant antecedent confidence in wide scope for modal knowledge. For on that view, lots of recombinations are ruled out as impossible. Which picture is correct? As recently pointed out by French and McKenzie (among others) current evidence from

Rough draft. In progress. In what follows, I will explicate what I call ‘the Cartesian Package’.  The Cartesian Package provides the basis for Descartes’ unique account of modal epistemology.  It has two main components: an account of the nature of objects and an account of forming adequate conceptions of them.   Take the former component first.  Given Descartes’ account of homogeneous objects, every object has a structure of properties that are related to one another in a way that’s crucial for his modal epistemology, as we will see.  First, they have a principal attribute, which is the most general and fundamental feature of an object.  This feature is a determinable, and it specifies the kind of object that a thing is, and all of the other sorts of properties that the thing can have.  Descartes, of course, took extension to be the principal attribute of material objects.   Second, objects have other attributes that flow necessarily and transparently from the principal attribute.   T