Van Inwagen's Nod to John Seddon
Much recent work in the epistemology of modality acknowledges the challenge of Peter van Inwagen's mitigated modal skepticism, especially as presented in his celebrated 1998 Phil. Studies paper, "Modal Epistemology". Furthermore, many have attempted to grapple with van Inwagen's arguments in that paper. Despite this, not many note van Inwagen's not-infrequent reference to John Seddon's 1972 Mind paper, "Logical Possibility" as an important source of his skepticism about modal claims remote from ordinary experience. This is significant, since (i) a common criticism is that van Inwagen's mitigated modal skepticism isn't sufficiently warranted, since he fails to motivate a presumption against modal claims remote from ordinary experience, and (ii) van Inwagen alludes to the arguments in Seddon's paper as a core basis for such a presumption. The aim of this post is thus to exposit the main points of Seddon's paper. The hope is that it